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This article is a response to the recent “Worrying Trends 
in Econophysics” critique written by four respected 
theoretical economists [1]. Two of the four have written 
books and papers that provide very useful critical 
analyses of the shortcomings of the standard textbook 
economic model, neo-classical economic theory [2,3] and 
have even endorsed my book [4]. Largely, their new 
paper reflects criticism that I have long made [4,5,6,7,] 
and that our group as a whole has more recently made 
[8]. But I differ with the authors on some of their 





1. Money, conservation laws, and neo-classical economics 
 
Our concerns are fourfold.  First, a lack of awareness of work 
which has been done within economics itself.  Second, 
resistance to more rigorous and robust statistical 
methodology.  Third,  the belief that universal empirical 
regularities can be found in many areas of economic activity.  
Fourth, the theoretical models which are being used to explain 
empirical phenomena. 
 
The latter point is of particular concern.  Essentially, the 
models are based upon models of statistical physics in which 
energy is conserved in exchange processes. 
 
Gallegati, Keen, Lux, and Ormerod [1] 
 
Since the authors of “Worrying” [1] begin with an attack on 
assumptions of conservation of money and analogs of 
conservation of energy in economic modelling, let me state 
from the outset that it would generally be quite useless to 
assume conserved quantities in economics and finance (see 
[4], Ch. 1). There is no reliable analog of energy in economics 
and there are very good reasons why no meaningful 
thermodynamic analogy can be constructed (see [4, Ch. 7]). In 
particular, money is not conserved. Money is created and 
destroyed rapidly via credit. Leveraging leads to big 
changes in ‘money’.  Are there any conservation laws at 
all in real markets, and if so do they have any 
significance for deducing market dynamics? 
 
Conservation laws follow from invariance principles [8], 
so one should not expect conservation laws in socio-
economic ‘motions’ like financial transactions or 
production and consumption [4,5]. We have identified 
exactly one invariance principle in finance: no arbitrage is 
equivalent to a discrete version of rotational invariance 
of the price distribution [see [4], Ch. 7). For inviolable 
mathematical laws of motion rather then era-dependent 
mathematical modelling we know from Wigner’s 
explanation why mathematics has been so ‘unreasonably 
effective’ in physics [8] that we would need the 
equivalent of all four space-time invariance principles: 
translational invariance, rotational invariance, time 
translational invariance, and Galilean invariance. Those 
local invariance principles are the foundation for the 
discovery of mathematical law in classical mechanics, 
quantum mechanics, and general relativity, as Wigner 
has explained. Wigner pointed out that without those 
underlying invariance principles mathematical law might 
well exist, in principle, but the world would be too 
complicated for us to discover mathematical law in 
practice. That is exactly where we stand in trying to 
make a science of socio-economic phenomena [7], but 
even in the absence of inviolable mathematical laws of 
trading behavior we are still able to generate finance 
market statistics dynamically accurately [4] in our era.  
 
In the definition of the neo-classical economic model 
(‘general equilibrium theory’ [9]) one global conservation 
law is assumed at the start. However, for the global 
integrability presumed for the existence of equilibrium 
there actually must be n global conservation laws, where 
n is the number of different goods exchanged by agents. 
The budget constraint combined with price dynamics, 
dp/dt=D(p)-S(p) (where D is total demand at price p 
and S is the total supply),  yields Walras’ law, a global 
conservation law that puts the motion in price space 
(phase space) on an n-sphere [4,9]. The budget 
constraint is conservation of money, and that constraint 
is badly violated in the real world, where money is 
created and destroyed with the tap of a computer key 
via credit.  
 
In the beginning of our current era of credit and 
deregulation, which we can date from the early 1970s, 
the supply-demand curves predicted by neo-classical 
economics [9] were falsified by Osborne [10], who 
simultaneously predicted the observable microeconomic 
supply and demand curves. In a strict gold-standard 
economy money would be conserved if mining 
production were ignored. Credit is required for the 
expansion of both industry and consumption, which is 
why we’re no longer on any sort of gold standard. 
Nixon took the Dollar off the (Rooseveltian) gold 
standard in 1972 due to the inflation created by the 
Vietnam War. Option pricing was deregulated in 1973, 
accidentally parallel with the revolutionary Black-Scholes 
paper. OPEC correctly understood the Dollar 
devaluation and raised the price of oil dramatically to 
compensate for the rapid inflation that would follow the 
degradation of the dollar. The deregulation of financial 
markets that followed is described in Liar’s poker [11].  
 
In contrast with the main concern of “Worries” [1], the 
work done in Fribourg, Boston, Alessandria, UCLA, 
Palermo, Oldenburg, and Houston, to name a few 
centers of econophysics research, do not assume 
conservation of money or any analog of conservation of 
energy. Searches for conservation laws can be found in 
the neo-classical economics literature [12,13], but those 
efforts bore no fruit at all for lack of a firm basis in 
empirical data.  
 
There is one econophysics model assuming conservation 
of money that is interesting within the historical context 
of neo-classical economic theory. Radner had observed 
in 1968 [14] that money/liquidity cannot appear in neo-
classical economics: with perfect foresight, perfect 
planning into the infinite future, there can be no liquidity 
demand (in real markets we have, in contrast, largely 
total ignorance, market as pure nonGaussian noise). 
Radner speculated that money/liquidity arises from 
uncertainty and also computational limitations, although 
he did not say what he meant by “computation” and  
apparently had no idea at all of a Turing machine [15]. 
Conservation of money is assumed in the simple trading 
model made by Bak, Nørrelyke and Shubik [16]. There, 
expected utility was maximized (so the paper is neo-
classsical) and then noise was added to see if “money” 
would emerge from the dynamics of trading. The 
attempt failed, the model is empirically irrelevant (as is 
every model of optimizing behavior) but can be 
understood as an honorable effort to address the 
mathematical problem posed by Radner’s discussion. I 
have no evidence that Per Bak was aware of Radner’s 
paper, but maybe  Shubik was aware of it.  The Bak et al 
model is asymptotically a pure barter model because 
statistical equilibrium is reached, and in general the 
authors of “Worries” are right that making further barter 
models is generally (both empirically and theoretically 
seen) useless. In our era, conservation of money is a silly 
assumption. The paper by Bak et al tried to bridge the 
gap between standard economic theory and 





2. Should econophysicists rely on the economics 
literature for guidance? 
 
Our concerns about developments within econophysics arise 
in four ways: 
 
• a lack of awareness of work which has been done within 
economics itself 
• resistance to more rigorous and robust statistical 
methodology 
• the belief that universal empirical regularities can be 
found in many areas of economic activity 
• the theoretical models which are being used to explain 
empirical phenomena  
 
…. One of the present authors has drawn the analogy of 
imagining ‘a new paper on quantum physics with no 
reference to received literature’ […]. 
Gallegati, Keen, Lux, and Ormerod [1] 
 
 
This leads into another concern expressed in [1], that 
ideas of production in economics theory are ignored by 
econophysicists. The problem with that criticism is that 
neo-classical models of production are no better than 
neo-classical exchange models: there is inadequate or 
nonexisting empirical basis for any neo-classical 
assumption. Econophysicists are safer to ignore the 
lessons taught in standard economics texts (both micro- 
and macro-) than to learn the economists’ production 
ideas and take them seriously (see Dosi [17] for non 
optimizing models of production, and see Zambelli [18] 
for a thorough and very interesting study of the degree 
of computational complexity of neo-classical production 
models). To be quite blunt, all existing ‘lessons’ taught in 
standard economics texts should be either abandoned or 
tested empirically, but should never be accepted as a 
basis for modelling. It’s important to understand what 
economists have done previously mainly to avoid making 
the same mistakes. Toward that end, see also Velupillai 
[19] for a critical discussion of the neo-classical 
equilibrium model from an economists’ perspective, 
where lack of computability of the neo-classical model 
would prevent agents from locating equilibrium even if 
the equilibrium point were stable, and even if the agents 
were as unrealistically well informed as the standard 
model so uncritically presumes.  
 
I will explain below why statistical analyses performed 
from the economists’ standpoint are generally 
untrustworthy, with few exceptions [20].  Our 
alternative to taking advice from economics texts and 
papers for the purpose of modelling markets will be 
stated below. 
 
Osborne [21] first introduced the lognormal stock pricing 
model in 1958 and should be honored as the first 
econophysicist, but even econophysicsts cite Bachelier 
while ignoring Osborne. Bachelier independently of 
Einstein, Markov and Smoluchowski produced some of 
the first results on Markov processes, but his finance 
model predicted negative prices and did not describe 
any market correctly, even to zeroth order. 
Econophysicists have contributed mightily in recent 
years to the study of financial markets, but that work is 
not yet finished. The authors of [1] are correct that the 
so-called ‘rigorous and robust’ methods of statisticians 
have generally not been used in econophysics, and for 
good reasons. In our group we begin with market 
histograms and then deduce an empirical model [4,21]. 
We have no mathematical model in mind a priori. We do 
not ‘massage’ the data. Data massaging is both 
dangerous and misleading. Econometricians mislead 
themselves and others into thinking that their models 
help us to understand market behavior. The reason is 
that economists assume a preconceived model [22,23] 
with several unknown parameters, and then try to force 
fit the model to a nonstationary time series by a ‘best 
choice of parameters’ (using ‘rigorous and robust 
methods’). Their conclusion is that the data are too hard 
to fit over long time scales [23]. Because we deduce our 
model from the data [4,7,24], we arrive at exactly the 
opposite conclusion: due to nonuniqueness in fitting any 
infinite precision model (stochastic or deterministic 
model) to inherently finite precision data, it is too easy to 
fit any set of histograms constructed from time series. 
We’ve illustrated this fact for financial time series but the 
lesson of nonuniqueness is not new: we anticipated it 
from our experience in nonlinear dynamics [4,5]. The 
reason why our group has not yet ventured into 
nonfinancial economic data analysis is that the problem 
there is horrendous: because of the sparseness of 
nonfinancial market data, it will likely be possible to fit 
the data using too many different unrelated classes of 
models [4,7]. The best one can hope for there will be to 
rule out certain model classes. One will never be able to 
‘understand’ the market data the way that we’ve 
managed to ‘understand’ financial markets.  
 
There is another very good reason to concentrate on 
finance markets in this era. With the magnitude and 
frequency of the enormous daily and even second by 
second transfers, finance markets dominate all other 
markets. Finance markets drive other markets globally. 
For some reason that I fail to understand, economists still 
tend to see finance markets as only one relatively 
insignificant market in their panoply.  
 
It is easy to generate hypothetical data sets which, when 
binned, can give misleading pictures of the statistical 
distributions which characterise them. [...] shows that data 
generated from a lognormal distribution can be easily 
misinterpreted as evidence of power laws. 
Gallegati, Keen, Lux, and Ormerod [1] 
 
It’s an old fractal-wive’s tale from the 1980s that 
lognormal densities mimic fat tails if you merely ‘eyeball’ 
them [25]. In a careful analysis using logarithmic returns, 
no such crude error is made. The reader must be aware 
that, with few enough decades in a log-log plot, lnf(x) 
looks linear in lnx where f(x) is a large class of smooth 
functions. About nonuniqueness in fitting infinite 
precision models to finite precision data, we have written 
enough [4,5,7]. 
 
However, the authors of [1] are correct that statistical 
physicists often express an unjustified expectation for 
universal scaling exponents even when there is no 
evidence for a critical point/bifurcation [4,5]. There is 
apparently no universality of scaling exponents in 
finance, where the fat tail exponents range from roughly 
2 to 7 [26] and are market dependent. Moreover, there is 
no reason at all to expect universality in socio-economic 
behavior [4,5].   
 
There is other criticism that can be levelled at 
econophysics and economics alike: most of us have not 
read and understood Osborne’s 1977 falsification [10] of 
standard economics theory, and so are not aware that 
we can expect only misguidance from most economics 
texts and papers. In econophysics, agent based 
modelling is often performed in an effort to explain fat 
tails, but fat tails without other market constraints are 
too easy to ‘explain’ [4]. Again, the authors of “Worries” 
are right that background in statistical physics has 
generally led to unjustified emphasis on scaling and 
universality. Agent based models have been constructed 
where the motion is asymptotically stationary, but 
stationary markets do not exist (I give no references here 
in order to protect the guilty, some of whom are my 
friends).  
 
Markets are not merely nonstationary, the time series 
generally exhibit nonstationary increments [27] as well, 
meaning that x(t+T)-x(t)≠x(T), where by equality we 
mean ‘equality in distribution’ (in addition, x(t) is 
assumed defined so that x(0)=0). This means that the 
increments depend not merely on the time difference T 
but on the starting point t as well. This complication makes 
time series analysis devilishly tricky. We are not yet 
satisfied that we understand how to perform a 
noncircular or mistake-free analysis of finance data that 
searches for scaling behavior [28]. The scaling of interest 
to us is of the form f(x,t)=t-HF(x/tH), where x is the 
logarithmic return and f is the returns density. That is, 
we look for a data collapse of the form F(u)=tHf(x,t) 
where u=x/tH. If such scaling holds, then the variance 
scales as tH, but that alone is not evidence for market 
correlations [27]. Papers have been published by very 
respectable finance researchers claiming market 
correlations on the basis of a Hurst exponent H≠1/2, see 
e.g. [29], but a Hurst exponent H≠1/2 does not imply 
long time correlations unless it has been first established 
that the time series has stationary increments [27] (see 
also [30,31] for a discussion of the scaling dynamics and 
lack of autocorrelations in Levy models). These different 
ideas are usually confused together into a thick soup by 
physicists and economists alike.  In particular, one 
should question any paper claiming to deduce a Hurst 
exponent from a spectral density: nonstationary time 
series have no spectral decomposition, and all financial 
time series are nonstationary (the moments of prices p(t) 
or returns x(t)=lnp(t)/pc never approach constants, 
where pc is dynamically defined ‘value’ [24]). Further, a 
nonstationary time series with unknown dynamics 
cannot be transformed into a stationary one (try it, as an 
exercise, using Ito calculus). The transformations 
purported to perform such magic in econometrics are 
akin to wishful thinking or praying for rain. Our dynamic 
definition of value is new and applies to nonfinancial 




3. Was econophysics previously anticipated? 
 
Econophysics has already made a number of important 
empirical contributions to our understanding of the social and 
economic world.  Many of these were anticipated in two  truly 
remarkable papers written in 1955 by Simon … and in 1963 
by Mandelbrot … , the latter in a leading economic journal.  
 
Gallegati, Keen, Lux, and Ormerod [1] 
 
 
Ignoring Osborne altogether, Simon and Mandelbrot are 
named [1] as having anticipated the main results of 
econophysics. This is false. Mandelbrot’s main 
contributions were the introduction of Levy distributions 
(fat tails for tail exponents in the range from 1 to 3) [32], 
the discussion of efficient markets in finance [33], and his 
explicit model of fractional Brownian motion (fBm) [34].   
 
Real financial markets are very hard to beat. The efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH) states that markets are 
impossible to beat: there are no correlations, no 
systematic patterns in prices that can be exploited for 
profit. If the drift can be subtracted out of a returns time 
series, then financial markets are Markovian (pure 
nonGausssian noise) to zeroth order, meaning that 
correlations like fBm would have to be a higher order 
effect [27]. Mandelbrot did not anticipate the correct 
description of the dynamics of financial markets, which is 
diffusive [4,27] rather than Levy [30,31]. Our modelling 
is a generalization of Osborne’s Gaussian returns model 
to the case where the diffusion coefficient D(x,t) is (x,t) 
dependent. Osborne’s model satisfies the EMH as does 
every Markov model. 
 
Fat tails in real markets are generally not described by 
Levy distributions because the Levy exponent range is 
from 1 to 3, whereas market exponents range from 2 to 
7. We can generate the observed fat tail densities via our 
approach, including all exponents from 2 to infinity [27] 
and with finite variance for exponents from 3 to infinity. 
But fat tails are not the main feature of interest in 
financial market dynamics. E.g., option prices blow up if 
fat tails are included [24,35]. Option traders must 
anticipate the dynamics of markets for small to moderate 
returns, but VAR requires the entire range of the returns 
distribution. 
 
So far as I can see, Herbert Simon anticipated no 
quantitative results from econophysics. Simon wrote 
many words but produced no mathematical market 
model. His paper on asymmetric distributions [1] is not 
an anticipation of econophysics. Levy distributions are 
generally asymmetric, exponential distributions are 
generally asymmetric, so are nearly all distributions. The 
trick is to generate the empirically observable market 
distributions dynamically, and Simon did not do that. His 
main idea, ‘Bounded Rationality’, can be interpreted as 
constraint on optimizing behavior (albeit not necessarily 
leading to equilibrium) and is therefore still a neo-
classical rather than an empirically based idea, although 
behavioral economists have tried through experiments to 
ground ‘bounded rationality’ empirically. The Bak et al 
model [16] can be seen as one of the few mathematically 
specific bounded rationality models (see also [36,37]). So 
far as I know, bounded rationality has produced no 
falsifiable predictions whereas econophysics, like 
physics, is based on on falsifiable predictions.   But the 
mainstream in the economics profession did not follow 
Simon, they instead followed game theory via Nash, 
whose ‘every man for himself’ equilibria they found to be 
comfortably neo-classical in spirit [38].  So far, that 
approach has not managed the transition from the 
nightmares of Dr. Strangelove [39] to the empirical reality 
of generating realistic market statistics or explaining 
markets qualitatively. But Nash’s game is not the only 
game in town. 
 
It’s well known that Brian Arthur inspired the Minority 
Game, which indeed has been solved extensively using 
analysis from statistical physics [40].  The game 
theoretical approach does not describe money 
transactions in real finance markets quantitatively, but 
some members of the Fribourg school have also made 
interesting agent based trading models based on actual 
limit book data [41]. We know now that an agent based 
model should reproduce at least three aspects of real 
markets in order to be taken seriously: nonstationarity 
with nonstationary increments, volatility (described 
locally by an (x,t) dependent diffusion coefficient, 
characterizing the noise traders), and fat tails.  
Predictions of fat tails from stationary distributions are 
both easy and uninteresting.  
 
In our group we’ve found that statistical physics alone 
does not provide an adequate background for 
econophysics. The advanced methods of statistical 
physics are confined to motions near statistical 
equilibrium whereas real financial markets exhibit no 
equilibrium whatsoever. Empirical evidence for statistical 
equilibrium has never been produced for any real market. 
We’ve found our experience in nonlinear dynamics to be 
very useful for thinking about the dynamics of real 
markets, although finance markets are not at all 
approximately deterministic.  For example, the distinction 
between local and global behavior is stressed in 
nonlinear dynamics, and one understands better why 
‘general equilibrium theory’ (neo-classical economics) is 
an impossible candidate for describing real markets if one 
has background in nonlinear dynamics (where 
integrability vs. nonintegrability and local vs. global are 
the key ideas). The stochastic models that we’ve 
discovered [27,42] in our (unending) attempt to 
understand financial markets cannot be found in any 
physics or math text. They were anticipated by no one, 
including Mandelbrot, Osborne, and Simon. They 
constitute an entirely new contribution to the theory of 
Markov processes. Finally, we place little or no weight 
on the related notions of ‘data mining’ and ‘financial 
engineering’. Nothing fundamental about how markets 
work has been discovered by following either path. 
 
Neo-classical economics has been falsified [10]. That it’s 
still the central topic of economics  texts means that it can 
be understood as the mathematized ideology of our era 
[4]. In physics and econophysics there are also trends 
that can be understood largely as mathematized 
philosophy. One of these is the Tsallis movement. 
Initially, the Tsallis model was proposed ad hoc as a 
statistical equilibrium model. Then, it was generalized to 
a dynamical model, but the original equilibrium model 
cannot be reproduced by the dynamic one applied in 
finance [43,44] with Hurst exponent H=1/(3-q), where q 
is the index in the model. Worse, the Tsallis dynamics 
model was presented for years as ‘nonlinear’ and 
nonMarkovian [43,44], while at the same time implicitly 
assuming a Markovian description in the form of an 
equivalent Langevin equation. No one in the Tsallis 
movement bothered to ask if a nonlinear diffusion 
equation is consistent with a Langevin equation. A 
Langevin equation with ordinary functions (rather than 
functionals) as drift and diffusion coefficients is always 
Markovian [27]. A Langevin description of truly 
nonlinear diffusion is impossible because a nonlinear 
diffusion equation has no Green function, and the Green 
function (transition probability density) is the defining 
feature of a Markov process. We showed recently that 
the Tsallis model is merely one special case of Markov 
dynamics, linear diffusion, for the general class of 
quadratic diffusion coefficients that scale with a Hurst 
exponent [27]. For the entire class of scaling quadratic 
diffusion coefficients a ‘nonlinear disguise’ is possible for 
the probability density, but the motion is generated by a 
(necessarily linear!) Fokker-Planck equation and so is 
strictly Markovian. Contrary to all the unjustified claims 
in the literature [43,44], there is no such thing as a 
‘nonlinear Fokker-Planck equation’. Mathematized 
philosophy like neo-classsical economic theory and the 
Tsallis model drain energy and effort away from 
meaningful research. 
 
... the ‘log-periodic’ business had been exaggerated into 
doomsday speculations published in serious journals [... for 
example], although not even its prophecies for the mundane 
world of the stock markets had ever been scrutinized in a 
rigorous fashion. 
 
The logperiodic model [45] is another model from 
econophysics. It gets both a plus and some minuses from 
us. The plus side is that the idea of a finite time 
singularity is interesting and should either be established 
or else falsified by a more careful and more critical 
empirical analysis. This leads to the minus side: there is 
no reason in that model (or in real data) to claim a 
bifurcation or critical point, all that appears in the model 
is a finite time singularity. Unfortunately, the model as 




4. Where are we headed? 
 
‘I believe in God and I believe in free markets.” 
Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, 
San Diego Union-Tribune, 2001 
 
There is little or nothing in existing micro- or 
macroeconomics texts [9,46,47] that is of value for 
understanding real markets. Economists have not 
understood how to model markets mathematically in an 
empirically correct way. Their only (once-) scientific 
model so far, the neo-classical one, has been falsified. 
What is now taught as standard economic theory will 
eventually disappear, no trace of it will remain in the 
universities or boardrooms because it simply doesn’t 
work [48,49]: were it engineering, the bridge would 
collapse. The reigning economic theory, based on the 
assumptions of optimizing behavior with infinite 
foresight, will be displaced by econophysics (where 
noise rather than foresight reigns supreme), meaning 
empirically based modelling where one asks not what we 
can do for the data (give it a massage), but instead asks 
what can we learn from the data about how markets 
really work. Existing standard economics texts are filled 
with scads of graphs [46,47], but those graphs are 
merely cartoons because they don’t represent real data, 
they represent only the falsified expectations of neo-
classical equilibrium theory [4]. No existing economic 
model provides us with a zeroth order starting point for 
understanding how real markets function. No current 
economics model or idea provides a starting point for 
building an interesting falsifiable market model. The 
future economics theory/econophysics texts will be filled 
with histograms, time series, and with graphs with big 
error bars, all representing real markets. They will look 
more like nuclear physics data (few data points, big error 
bars) than like the smooth curves in the existing 
economics texts. The aim will be to try to understand 
how markets work, not to present an irrelevant model 
about how a real market ideally should (but cannot) 
behave.  Comparisons of neo-classical economics with 
Newton’s first law are irrelevant and terribly misleading: 
Newton’s first law is realized locally in every observable 
gravitational trajectory. Neo-classical behavior, in 
contrast, approximates no real market locally. Future 
economics texts will ask many questions but will provide 
few answers. That is uncomfortable, but that is the 
reality of markets. The good news is that economics 
research will not end because most of the important 
questions there can likely never be answered.  Soros’ 
message [49] must be taken seriously and understood 
because he’s right. In social behavior, each agent has a 
perception/illusion of reality but one never knows how 
big is the gap between one’s illusion and ‘social reality’, 
which is always unknown. We get an incomplete picture 
of social reality from history (market time series). As time 
goes on, one gains new knowledge and has the chance 
to correct one’s perception of reality, one has the chance 
partly to correct one’s mistakes [49], but our illusions can 
never completely or in controlled fashion be corrected. 
Skepticism, not belief, must reign supreme in economics, 
finance, and politics. Soros has repeated his basic ideas 
in too many books, but we can see him as one of the 
most perceptive social scientists of our era. No one 
knows yet how to mathematize what Soros tries to teach 
us about markets [24]. Our empiric-dynamic 
identification of ‘value’ is the starting point for thinking 
about Soros’ type of ‘technical analysis’. To try to follow 
Soros’ argument and mathematize it is to deal with true 
mathematical complexity, something that we have done 
neither in economics nor in econophysics (see Zambelli 
[18] for an example of how to program a Turing machine 
and study the algorithmic complexity of a model on your 
laptop). True complexity has been handled so far only in 
biology (the genetic code and its consequences), where, 
as Ivar Giæver has noted [50], there are many facts and 
very few equations.  
 
Let me end anecdotally and then with a suggestion. 
Physicists have gone into biology and econophysics 
because that's where the interesting problems are. 
Turbulence and quantum coherence (mesoscopics) 
remain the outstanding unsolved problems of physics. 
We meet real complexity in nature in cell biology, also in 
quantum computation, along with econophysics they’re 
the fields of the future in physics. Every physics student 
should be required to take a good, stiff course in cell 
biology from a text like „Fat Alberts“ [51], as Ivar 
Giæver calls it. Physicists were hired by banks and 
trading  houses beginning in the 1980s. It's no mistake 
that Fischer Black, the driving force behind the Black-
Scholes-Merton model (which assumes Osborne's 
lognormal distribution without referencing it) was 
trained as a physicist. Physicists go into econophysics 
largely because it's interesting, and with the hope of 
getting a well-paying job after the Ph. D. Trading houses 
do not hire many people from economics or finance 
because the products of economics and business 
departments don't know enough math and are 
unprepared for both data analysis and computer 
intensive modeling. I gave a talk to the Enron modelers 
in June, 2000. Of the thirty, they were overwhelmingly 
from physics and engineering, with two from math. 
None were from economics. Two group leaders had 
Ph.D.s in experimental physics. The management, not 
the modellers, made Enron go belly up. George Soros, if 
he’s true to his words, does not carry any belief that’s  
free of skepticism. Enron wanted our group to work for 
them in 2000. We refused because they wanted data 
mining and also technical research aimed at pricing 
weather options. The offer of money was not seductive, 
we strongly and rightly preferred to stick with 
fundamental research of our own choice, so we refused. 
The Arrow-Debreu-Merton program [52] fails: when 
insufficient liquidity exists, meaning market statistics are 
too sparse or even nonexistent (as with gas stored in the 
ground, or predicting details of the weather). In such a 
case option pricing is like a stab in the dark, but Enron 
modelers were required by management to price options 
on gas stored in the ground. It was necessary to invent 
statistics out of thin air. You simply cannot put a price 
on everything when the noise traders [4, 53] are too few 
to provide liquidity. 
 
 
The real problem with my proposal for the future of 
economics departments is that current economics and 
finance students typically do not know enough 
mathematics to understand (a) what econophysicists are 
doing, or (b) to evaluate the neo-classical model (known 
in the trade as ‘The Citadel’) critically enough to see, as 
Alan Kirman [54] put it, that ‘No amount of attention to 
the walls will prevent The Citadel from being empty’. I 
therefore suggest that the economists revise their 
curriculum and require that the following topics be 
taught: calculus through the advanced level, ordinary 
differential equations  (including advanced), partial 
differential equations (including Green functions), 
classical mechanics through modern nonlinear dynamics, 
statistical physics, stochastic processes (including solving 
Smoluchowski-Fokker-Planck equations), computer 
programming (C, Pascal, etc.) and, for complexity, cell 
biology. Time for such classes can be obtained in part by 
eliminating micro- and macro-economics classes from the 
curriculum. The students will then face a much harder 
curriculum, and those who survive will come out ahead. 
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stimulating discussions of how to improve the current 
economics curriculum mathematically, and to a referee for 





1. M. Gallegatti, S. Keen, T. Lux, and P. Ormerod, 
“Worrying Trends in Econophysics”, submitted to Physica 
A, 2006. 
 
2. P. Ormerod, The Death of Economics. Faber & Faber: 
London, 1994. 
 
3. S. Keen, Debunking Economics: the Naked Emperor of the 
Social Sciences. Zed Books, 2001. 
 
4. J.L. McCauley, Dynamics of Markets: Econophysics and 
Finance, Cambridge, Cambridge, 2004. 
 
5. J.L. McCauley, Physica A237, 387, 1997.  
 
6. J. L. McCauley, Physica A355,1 2005. 
 
7. J. L. McCauley in “Computability, Complexity and 
Constructivity in Economic Analysis”, ed. K. Velupillai, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 2005. 
 
8. E.P. Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections. Univ. Indiana, 
Bloomington, 1967.  
 
9. H.R. Varian, Microeconomics Analysis. Norton, New 
York, 1992. 
 
10. M.F.M. Osborne, The Stock Market and Finance from a 
Physicist’s Viewpoint, Crossgar, Minneapolis, 1977. 
 
11. M. Lewis, Liar's Poker, Penguin, New York, 1989. 
 
12. P. Samuelson, "Conservation laws in economics" in 
“Japan and the World Economy”, Elsevier 16(3), pages 243-
246, August, 2004. 
 
13.R. Sato, “Theory of Technical Change and Economic 
Invariance, Application of Lie Groups”, Academic,  
NY, 1981. 
 
14. R. Radner, Econometrica 36, 31, 1968. 
 
15. R. Radner, email, 2004. 
 
16. P. Bak, S.F. Nørrelykke, and M. Shubik, The 
Dynamics of Money, Phys. Rev. E60, 2528, 1999. 
 
17. G. Dosi, Innovation, Organization and Economic 
Dynamics: Selected Essays, Elgar, Cheltenham, 2001. 
 
18. S. Zambelli in Workshop on Computable Economics, 
Dept. of Economics NUI Galway, COBERA, 21-25 March 
2005 Lecture Notes. 
 
19. K. Velupillai, K. Computable Economics: The Arne Ryde 
Lectures, Oxford, Oxford, 2000. 
 
20. G. Bottazzi and A.Secchi, Review of Industrial 
Organization 23, 217, 2003; Review of Industrial 
Organization 26, 195, 2005. 
 
21. M.F.M. Osborne, in The Random Character of Stock 
Market Prices, ed. P. Cootner, Cambridge, MIT, 1964. 
 
22. C.W.J. Granger, Empirical modeling in Economics: 
Specification and Evaluation, Cambridge: Cambridge, 
1999. 
 
23. P. McAdam, and A.J.H. Hallett, in Surveys in Economic 
Dynamics, ed. D.A.R. George, L.  Oxley, and S. Potter,  
Blackwell, Oxford, 2001.  
 
24.  J. L. McCauley, G.H. Gunaratne, & K.E. Bassler, in 
Dynamics of Complex Interconnected Systems, Networks and 
Bioprocesses, ed. A.T. Skjeltorp & A. Belyushkin, 
Springer, NY, 2005. 
 
25. J.L. McCauley, Physica A197, 528, 1993. 
 
26. M. Dacorogna et al., An Intro. to High Frequency 
Finance, Academic Pr., N.Y., 2001. 
 
27. K.E. Bassler, G.H. Gunaratne, & J.L. McCauley, Hurst 
Exponents, Markov Processes and Nonlinear Diffusion 
Equations, to appear in Physica A, 2006. 
 
28. A. L. Alejandro-Quinones, K.E. Bassler, J.L. 
McCauley, and G.H. Gunaratne, in preparation, 2006. 
 
29.  T. Di Matteo, T.Aste, & M.M. Dacorogna, Physica 
A324, 183, 2003. 
 
30. E. Scalas, R. Gorenflo and F. Mainardi, Physica A284, 
376, 2000. 
 
31. F. Mainardi, M. Raberto, R. Gorenflo and E. Scalas 
Physica A 287, 468, 2000. 
 
32. Mandelbrot, B. in 1964 The Random Character of Stock 
Market Prices (MIT: Cambridge, Mass.), ed. P. Cootner. 
 
33.  B. Mandelbrot, J. Business 39, 242, 1966. 
 
34. B. Mandelbrot & J. W. van Ness, 1968. SIAM Rev. 10, 
2, 422. 
 
35. J. L. McCauley, G.H. Gunaratne, & K.E. Bassler, 
Finance Market Dynamics with Option Pricing, submitted, 
2006. 
 
36. G.A. Ackerlof, An Economic Theorist’s Book of Tales, 
Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1984. 
 
37. J.E. Stiglitz, A.  Weiss, Oxford Economic Papers 44, 2, 
694, 1992. 
 
38. P. Mirowski, Machine Dreams, Cambridge Univ. Pr., 
Cambridge, 2002. 
 
39. M. Hausner, J.F. Nash, L.S. Shapley, & M. Shubik, 
"’So Long Sucker’, A Four-Person Game", in M. Shubik 
(ed.) Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social 
Behavior, Wiley, N.Y., 1964. 
 
40. D. Challet, M. Marsili, Yi-Cheng Zhang, Minority 
Games : Interacting Agents in Financial Markets, Oxford, 
Oxford, 2005. 
 
41. S. Maslov, Physica A 278, 571-578 (2000) 
 
42. A. L. Alejandro-Quinones, K.E. Bassler, M. Field, J.L. 
McCauley, M. Nicol, I. Timofeyev, A. Török, and G.H. 
Gunaratne, Physica 363A, 383-392, 2006. 
 
43. L. Borland, Phys. Rev. E57, 6634, 1998. 
 
44. L. Borland, Quantitative Finance 2, 415, 2002. 
 
45.  A. Johansen, O. Ledoit and D. Sornette, Crashes as 
Critical Points, International Journal of Theoretical and 
Applied Finance 3, No. 2 219-255 (2000) 
 
46. R.J. Barro, Macroeconomics, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1977. 
 
47. N.G. Mankiw, Principles of Macroeconomics. South-
Western College Publishing: Mason, Ohio, 2000. 
 
48. J.E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, Norton, 
N.Y., 2002. 
 
49. G. Soros The Crisis of Global Capitalism, Little, Brown 
& Co., N.Y., 1998. 
 
50. Ivar Giæver, comment made in lecture at a Geilo 
NATO-ASI, ca. 2001. 
 
51. B. Alberts, Molecular Biology of the Cell, Garland Publ., 
N.Y., 2002. 
 
52. N. Dunbar, Inventing Money, Long-Term Capital 
Management and the Search for Risk-Free Profits, Wiley, 
New York, 2000. 
 
53. F. Black, J. of Finance 3, 529, 1986. 
 
54. A. Kirman,  The Economic Journal 99, 126, 1989. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
